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ROSANNA SPARACINO
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY:
HOW WE OUGHT TO ADDRESS 
THE ART OF IMMORAL ARTISTS
ABSTRACT
I argue that biographical information is akin to other non-aesthetic, social, 
historical, or political information. As such, artist’s biographies are always 
relevant and important when interpreting art. While the meaning and value of 
a piece of art is not determined by any single piece of contextual information, 
neither is its meaning and value ever entirely separated from context. In some 
cases, however, a piece of art that is technically magnificent may be experienced 
as repugnant when the artist has committed egregious acts.
I. THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY
In “The Intentional Fallacy,” literary theorist William Wimsatt and 
philosophy Monroe Beardsley discuss the problem of trying to interpret 
art while relying on authorial intent.1 One commits the intentional 
fallacy when one attempts to discern the meaning of a piece of art in 
part or in full by assuming the intent or purpose of the person who 
created it.1 Their primary argument is that, when assessing the success 
of an artistic work, “the design or intention of the author is neither 
available nor desirable as a standard for” determining this success.2 
Their anti-intentionalist argument is based on the notion that the 
artwork “is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world 
beyond his power to intend about it or control it.”3  
They examine three types of evidence used when interpreting 
artworks: external, internal, and intermediate. Ultimately, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley argue that one commits the intentional fallacy when 
they “look to features external to the work for help in coming to an 
understanding of the work.”4 External evidence includes anything 
private—journals, letters, or reported conversations—that reveals 
how or why the artist created the work.5  However, using evidence 
that is internal to the artwork and available to the public—such as 
formal aesthetic elements—avoids committing the fallacy. Finally, 
Wimsatt and Beardsley describe intermediate evidence as that which 
concerns “the character of the author, or about private and semi-private 
meanings attached to words.”6 Wimsatt and Beardsley note that the 
problem with this third type of evidence is that it is more slippery; use 
of it only sometimes leads one to commit the intentional fallacy. Further, 
they suggest that it is difficult to distinguish intermediate evidence from 
1 William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” The 
Sewanee Review 54, no. 3 (Summer 1946): 468-488.
2 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 468.
3 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 470.
4 Garry Hagberg, “Artistic Intention and Mental Image,” Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 22, no. 3 (October 1988): 66, doi:10.2307/3333051. Italics Added.
5 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 478.
6 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 478.
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external evidence. They admit, “the three types of evidence, especially 
[external] and [intermediate], shade into one another so subtly that it is 
not always easy to draw a line between examples, and hence arises the 
difficulty for criticism.”7  
Besides Wimsatt and Beardsley, other philosophers have engaged 
with the intentional fallacy and the role of the artist’s biographical 
information. Noel Carroll interprets hard anti-intentionalism as a 
position where “reference to artistic intention and the biography 
of the artist are never relevant to interpretation of the meaning of 
artworks.”8  However, in response to Carroll’s interpretation of 
anti-intentionalism, philosopher Kent Wilson clarifies that anti-
intentionalists do not necessarily deny the relevance of biographical 
information to interpretation but instead deny the strict constraint that 
this information ought to have on interpretation.9  
I agree with both Wilson and Wimsatt and Beardsley that an artist 
cannot control the ultimate reading of his art after he has created it. 
In fact, Wilson demonstrates how untenable intentionalism is with an 
example where a sexist remark, intended to be a humorous quip, is 
still interpreted as degrading regardless of what the speaker’s intentions 
are.10 My own argument embraces the notion that we can interpret 
art irrespective of what the artist says about his work. I argue that we 
ought to interpret or understand art not as the artist intends or suggests 
but instead by taking biographical information into account alongside 
other aesthetic elements to inform our critical understanding of the 
works. However, unlike what Wimsatt and Beardsley assume about the 
detachment of the author, I do not agree that one can ever abstract the 
artist away from the work or, as William H. Gass suggests, forget that 
someone did it.11  While the artist may not be a sufficient condition for 
the work of art—as many other factors contribute to the creation of an 
artwork—the artist is certainly a necessary condition for its creation. 
Acknowledging that someone was responsible for creating the work, 
regardless of what they may have intended, is central to my position. 
I argue that biographical information regarding the immorality 
of an artist’s character is important and should color our general 
understanding, interpretations, or reinterpretations of art. In cases 
where the immoral character of the artist is known, this information 
7 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” 478.
8 Noel Carroll, “The Intentional Fallacy: Defending Myself,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55, no. 3 (1997): 305, doi:10.2037/431800.
9 Kent Wilson, “Confession of a Weak Anti-Intentionalist: Exposing Myself,” 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55, no. 3 (July 1997): 310, 
doi:10.2307/431801.
10 Wilson, “Confession of a Weak Anti-Intentionalist,” 310-311.
11 William H. Gass, “The Death of the Author,” Salmagundi, no. 65 (October 
1984): 11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40547668.
ought to be taken into legitimate critical consideration. Theories of 
interpretation should not restrict criticism so that it neglects general 
biographical information. This view provides a morally defensible way 
to address the art of problematic artists.
II. IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE 
Philosopher Kathleen Stock relies on intentionalism to develop a 
solution to the problem of enjoying the work of morally problematic 
artists, such as Woody Allen. Her solution is connected to what 
philosophers of fiction term “the puzzle of imaginative resistance.”12  
This puzzle, she explains, is where readers resist imagining what 
certain fictional passages ask them to imagine. Stock suggests that we 
experience imaginative resistance when “we are led to think…that 
those passages are asking us to engage in…counterfactual imagining.”13  
This kind of imagining is “in service of what would or could or might 
be the case” given that some other imagined scenario were also the 
case.14 Some pieces of fiction, as intended by the author, direct us to 
make and believe certain counterfactual conclusions. However, in 
Stock’s view, had belief in these counterfactual conclusions not been 
ascribable to authorial intention, readers would not experience resistance. 
As it relates to the problem of Woody Allen and his filmography, Stock 
concludes that we are not morally compromised in enjoying his work 
because Allen’s problematic values are not endorsed in any of his work, 
save for Manhattan. As she phrases it “there is no serious implication in 
any of his films, intended to be believed by the viewer, that pedophilia 
is acceptable or in any way permissible.”15 Therefore, one cannot 
interpret the films as inviting, through imagining, the endorsement of a 
counterfactual about the permissibility of pedophilia.
There are two problems with Stock’s argument that keep it from 
being entirely compelling. First, she relies on the notion of artistic 
intention to suggest that Allen does not endorse pedophilia—a notion 
that I have already discussed as irrelevant. If Allen had suggested that 
Manhattan was not intended to endorse pedophilia, that would not 
change or undermine arguments, stemming from evidence provided 
by the film, that Manhattan does indeed endorse pedophilia. Second, 
the problem with her claim that we are “uncompromised” in enjoying 
Allen’s films is that she does not consider that our attention matters 
and is taken into account when deciding what kind of art gets made, 
12 Kathleen Stock, “Imaginative Resistance and the Woody Allen Problem,” 
Thinking About Fiction (blog), November 13, 2017, https://www.
thinkingaboutfiction.me/blog/2017/11/12/imaginative-resistance-and-the-
woody-allen-problem.
13 Stock, “Imaginative Resistance.”
14 Stock, “Imaginative Resistance.”
15 Stock, “Imaginative Resistance.”
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curated, or financially supported. If people with the financial power 
to fund art recognize that we are willing to look at and appreciate art 
that is made by problematic artists, these artists will continue to enjoy 
support, financial benefits, and even persist in their moral transgressions 
without trouble. Therefore, it seems we may be compromised in 
enjoying the works of Allen, even when his films do not endorse 
pedophilia. However, Stock’s argument that the problem of imaginative 
resistance (regarding immorality in art) signals an aesthetic flaw in the 
work suggests that these works may be rejected for moral and aesthetic 
reasons. Numerous philosophers have engaged with this particular 
position, and it is worth examining further. 
III. DEALING WITH INFECTED ART: 
OTHER APPROACHES  
There are reasons for condemning the art of immoral artists, 
especially when we believe the work demonstrates, expresses, or is 
connected to what is known or believed about an artist’s immorality 
or problematic character. Stephanie Patridge argues that the immoral 
character of the artist “not only legitimately affects our appreciative 
response...but we might think that they should.”16 Specifically, she 
suggests that “[i]t seems that sometimes facts about an artist’s moral 
life will affect our interpretation of, attribution of appreciative relevant 
properties to, and overall evaluation of an artist’s work.”17 However, 
Patridge argues that there is no similar plausible claim to be made 
when the art is not obviously infected. In other words, if the artwork is 
uninfected, our appreciative response is unaffected by any revelations 
about the artist’s moral life. 
Similar to Patridge, Eva Dadlez posits that there may be ethical 
grounds for condemning art when the work appears to “endorse a 
problematic attitude.”18 Moreover, she notes that other philosophers 
believe that this kind of endorsement undermines the aesthetic value of 
the piece. Specifically, she draws on David Hume’s argument in “Of the 
Standard of Taste” where he claims that we cannot “relish” works where 
“vicious manners are described without being marked with the proper 
characters of blame and disapprobation.”19 She then notes Carroll’s 
16 Stephanie Patridge, “Some Thoughts on Art, Appreciation, and 
Masturbation,” Daily Nous, last modified November 21, 2017, http://
dailynous.com/2017/11/21/philosophers-art-morally-troubling-
artists/#Patridge.
17 Patridge, “Some Thoughts on Art.”
18 Eva Dadlez, “Flaws, Aesthetic and Moral,” Daily Nous, last modified 
November 21, 2017, http://dailynous.com/2017/11/21/philosophers-art-
morally-troubling-artists/#Dadlez.
19 Dadlez, “Flaws, Aesthetic and Moral.”
assessment of Hume’s argument that suggests this incapacity to enjoy 
morally flawed works indicates an aesthetic flaw.20 Dadlez and Patridge 
are right to suggest that when the immorality of an artist manifests in 
the artwork, those works are potentially aesthetically flawed or at least 
less good. One may find it harder to become immersed in the artwork 
and can experience, as Stock discusses, imaginative resistance. In fact, 
one study suggests that there is a strong correlation between one’s moral 
evaluation and aesthetic evaluation.21 Participants in the study who 
judged the actions of the artistic subject to be wrong also viewed it as less 
aesthetically appealing. Further, once one becomes aware of the fact that 
an artist is immoral, and the artwork directly reminds you of that odious 
fact, it seems highly unlikely that one could leave that knowledge behind 
so that our appreciative responses are unaffected. 
However, Dadlez and Patridge are unclear about what they 
mean when they suggest that we have grounds for “condemning” 
or “rejecting” these works of art. I do not agree with one possible 
interpretation—that these works should be removed from our 
institutions—so long as the art demonstrates impressive technical skill 
or maintains historical importance. As philosophers Matthew Strohl 
and Mary Beth Willard point out, if one views and appreciates art 
strictly through a moral lens, this may ruin one’s ability to appreciate 
art, especially since the revealed immorality of our favorite artists seems 
so common.22 The person who views art through a moralistic lens 
is doing so “at the expense of severely impoverishing their aesthetic 
life.”23  However, it appears correct that our aesthetic evaluations are 
inevitably altered in light of these immoral revelations. These works 
are less good in one morally-rooted way, but their overall quality is not 
entirely diminished. As Beyrs Gaut suggests, 
there are a plurality of aesthetic values, of which the ethical values of 
artworks are but a single kind. So…a work of art may be judged to 
be aesthetically good insofar as it is beautiful, is formally unified and 
strongly expressive, but aesthetically bad insofar as…it manifests ethically 
reprehensible attitudes.24
Nevertheless, since I am more concerned with how to address the art 
of problematic artists—regardless if the artwork is infected or not—I 
20 Dadlez, “Flaws, Aesthetic and Moral.”
21 Shen-yi Liao, “Genre Moderates Morality’s Influence on Aesthetics” 
(unpublished manuscript, University of Puget Sound, 2010), 5.
22 Matthew Strohl and Mary Beth Willard, “Aesthetics, Morality, and a Well-
Lived Life,” Daily Nous, last modified November 21, 2017, http://dailynous.
com/2017/11/21/philosophers-art-morally-troubling-artists/#StrohlWillard.
23 Strohl and Willard, “Aesthetics, Morality.”
24 Berys Gaut, “The Ethical Criticism of Art,” in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays 
at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 183.
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believe Patridge and Dadlez ultimately do not go far enough with their 
interpretive theories. 
Interestingly, Patridge also considers cases where certain moral 
violations are so egregious that they could plausibly merit the rejection 
of the artist’s work as a whole. She suggests that this may be the case 
when it comes to the artworks of Adolf Hitler, but she is not so sure 
how well this line of argument would apply to the films of Roman 
Polanski. Her reasoning is that Hitler’s racism is more of a settled moral 
violation than Polanski’s rape of a female child.25 Patridge’s attention to 
Hitler’s art is not completely satisfying, since his work does not exhibit 
high technical ability, nor does it have historic aesthetic importance. 
The art world’s lack of an original Hitler painting is not much of a 
loss, at least as it compares to the potential loss of a Polanski film. The 
tension that we feel when we find out that the person who created our 
favorite work of art is a morally flawed individual is not a tension felt in 
the case of Hitler’s art. 
IV. APPLYING MY APPROACH TO ALL 
ART: OBJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Again, my view is that our interpretations of art should take 
knowledge of the artist’s immorality into account. If the artwork is 
infected, our direct aesthetic evaluations of the work are and should be 
colored, as Patridge and Dadlez suggest. This is true even if the artwork 
is uninfected, even if the moral failing is not touched on in the art. 
Audiences and critics have a duty, when the immorality of an artist is 
revealed, to bring this knowledge with them into the galleries, theaters, 
or other venues where one may engage with the art of problematic artists. 
As I have noted, some anti-intentionalists hold that artworks 
should be interpreted, appreciated, or engaged with on “pure” aesthetic 
grounds, separate from any contextual information such as biography. 
The problem with this is that obtaining a pure reading or interpretation 
of anything is nearly impossible. We often bring something—an 
assumption or ideological framework—with us when we engage 
with cultural artifacts like artworks. Those who think or argue that 
they are doing a neutral, pure, or objective analysis are choosing to 
ignore the fact that we enter modes of aesthetic evaluation and artistic 
interpretation already inculcated with certain beliefs, which are often 
informed by the status quo or dominant cultural ideology. Therefore, 
ostensibly “pure” aesthetic evaluation and interpretation actually stems 
from an ideology already embedded in one’s belief system, and—
embedded so deeply and imperceptibly—it feels like an objective 
  25  Patridge, “Some Thoughts on Art.”
insight or a truth more than just another interpretive belief.
 Further, the social, historical, and political context of an artwork 
is frequently mentioned by art critics and historians. This type of 
contextual information is seen as valuable, legitimate, valid, and 
important for developing a fuller, richer interpretive understanding of 
the art. If these non-aesthetic features are considered legitimate grounds 
for criticism and interpretive theory, biographical information, especially 
regarding the immorality of an artist, should be considered legitimate 
grounds for interpretation as well. Biographical information is just 
another piece of non-aesthetic, contextual information just like the 
social, historical, and political context. Perhaps part of the reason why 
biographical information about artists—especially when it concerns the 
immorality of male artists whose moral transgression are so often forms 
of misogynistic behavior—is not considered as critically legitimate as 
other non-aesthetic features has to do with the male dominance in the 
field of art criticism and art in general. For one, recognition of this male 
dominance in the art world reveals that the viewpoint of what counts as 
legitimate criticism is ultimately a male viewpoint. Further, given this 
dominant male viewpoint in conjunction with the male-saturated art 
world, there are structural incentives to put forth non-provocational 
criticism that does not endanger the status of prominent male artists. 
Ultimately, the primarily male critics and aesthetic theorists wish—
implicitly or explicitly, intentionally or unintentionally—to protect the 
group of largely male artists. If we acknowledge biographical information 
concerning the immorality of male artists, and consider this information 
right alongside any other aesthetic interpretation of art, the status and 
reputation of those male artists is seriously threatened. As a result, my 
approach to the problem of dealing with the art of immoral artist’s is 
likewise a threat to the dominance and privilege of male artists. 
In fact, one major and potentially threatening implication to my 
approach is that it helps to reshape the culture around artists and what 
is considered legitimate criticism. On my approach, we need not 
tolerate or accept that problematic artists are the norm. Nor need we 
believe that good art comes as the expense of being a bad person. My 
approach has higher demands for artists and their character by signaling 
that their moral transgressions are relevant and unacceptable. Further 
my approach urges the development and embracing of critical theories 
that acknowledge biographical information as not just sometimes relevant 
but rather as always relevant and always important. Ultimately, my 
approach punishes the artist, not the patron. The interpretations that 
result from my approach avoid the “pure” aesthetic analysis which 
allows for the artist’s skills or “genius” to override and erase his moral 
abuses. In other words, artists are no longer glorified persons who 
can have their reputations protected or elevated by their artistry. 
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However, the audience or patrons get to “keep” or engage with the 
art while acknowledging the problematic nature of the person who 
created the work. My approach further punishes the problematic artist 
by encouraging them to recognize that our knowledge of their immoral 
abuses denies them the privilege of a “pure” reading of their work. This 
is precisely what photographer Nicholas Nixon regretfully recognized 
when he was accused of sexual misconduct by several of his students. 
He asked to have his photography exhibition taken down, claiming 
“I believe it is impossible for these photographs to be viewed on their 
own merits any longer.”26  Under my approach, this is what artists must 
contend with when making moral decisions in their private and  
public lives.   
26 Katharine Q. Seelye, “Boston Museum Closes Nicholas Nixon 
Photography Show Early,” New York Times, last modified April 12, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/arts/design/ica-boston-closes-
nicholas-nixon-photography-show.html.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Rosanna Sparacino is an English 
and philosophy major at Elmhurst 
College in Elmhurst, Illinois. Her 
philosophical interests include 
aesthetics, critical and literary 
theory, and philosophy of language. 
After graduating, Rosanna plans on 
pursuing a master’s in composition 
studies and rhetoric where she can 
investigate the intersection between 
ordinary language philosophy and 
composition theory.
